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 Introduction 
The Middle East and North African (MENA) region remains volatile. There is a power struggle in 
Libya, civil war in Syria and war in Yemen.  Iran and Israel are either considered regional threats 
or each see the region as a threat.  Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
institute (SIPRI) collaborate the volatility of the region.  Military spending in the Middle East 
amounted to $196 billion in 2014, an increase of 5.2 per cent over 2013, and 57 per cent since 
2005 (SIPRI 2014 report). 
Sandler and George (2016) provide details by selected countries within MENA region to highlight 
phenomenal increases in military spending ranging from 1410% increase in Algeria to a modest 
35% increase in Morocco for the post-Cold War period.  While Arab countries continue to 
dominate the defence burden rankings (military spending as a ratio of GDP), the 2017 SIPRI report 
also identified interesting trends in the so called MENA region.  First the fall in oil since 2014 has 
led to sharp declines in military spending.  Second, these same oil-exporting nations have 
prioritized their fiscal allocation towards social sectors (SIPRI, 2017).    
The rise in defense spending in the Middle East raises concern over the potential for a regional 
arms race, which would make an already volatile region more unstable.  However, recent research 
in international affairs and economics argues that military expenditures in the region is not only 
driven by the national security environment but also and most importantly as a way to provide rents to 
militaries and their political patrons (Springborg, 2011).  ‘Resource curse’ is often mentioned as 
another driver of military spending in the region (Bannon and Collier, 2003; Ali and Abdellatif, 2015). 
Arab Spring and the domestic unrest and the threat of terrorism that followed are not the main 
causes of the recent spike in military spending in the region, as the bulk of arms purchases have 
largely been conventional heavy weaponry, such as combat aircraft, armored vehicles, and missile 
systems.  We revisit the study of the demand for military expenditures with a particular emphasis 
on the responsiveness of military spending to threat.  We use the extended time series on military 
expenditures from SIPRI along with a comprehensive treatment of threat variables that span local, 
regional and global spheres.   
Specifically, we employ strategic clusters as discussed and developed in Markowski and Tani 
(2005) and operationalize it by adapting it to the MENA region.  Global threat variables are further 
augmented by using nuclear arsenal data from Douch and Solomon (2014).  We also incorporate 
the notion of status seeking as discussed in Douch and Solomon (2014 and 2016) to examine 
whether military spending in MENA region can be considered a positional good. 
The results indicate that military spending in the MENA region does exhibit high income elasticity 
and status is further signaled through regional clubs such as the Arab League.  MENA countries 
face substantial opportunity cost of military spending and only weakly respond to local threats.  
The so-called ‘resource curse’ is not a strong indicator of military posture in MENA especially 
within the neoclassical demand model setting and robust estimation that account for dynamics and 
endogeneity.    
The rest of the study is structured as follows.  In the next section we discuss the relevant literature 
and study scope.  Section 3 presents the empirical setup and discusses some key estimation 
techniques.  Section 4 presents the data and results and the last section concludes and points to 
future studies.   
2. Brief Literature Review 
Springborg (2011) gives a useful spectrum of military business involvement in the Middle East, 
starting from high (Egypt and Iran, with economic activities spanning almost the entire national 
economy), though Syria and Sudan (where military business activity is restricted mostly to military 
business) through Algeria (where the military prefers the hidden world of side-payments rather 
than direct economic involvement to low involvement (the Gulf Cooperation Council-GCC 
countries and Tunisia). 
As mentioned earlier the ‘resource curse’ explains the rising trend in military expenditures in 
MENA regions.  While Bannon and Collier (2003)underscore this relationship, Ali and Abdelatif 
(2015) provide a more nuanced relationship with oil and forestry showing positive and significant 
results while other types of resources (coal, etc) tend to sho no significant relationship.  Aside from 
public choice considerations, Adams and Ciprut (1995) and Markowski and Tani (2005) focus on 
the development of a security cluster to better reflect the strategic and spatial interactions between 
nations to tease out a detailed model of military expenditures determinants.   
The other relevant literature focuses on the use of more robust econometric techniques to better 
understand and estimate dynamics and strategic interactions.  Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) 
provide relevant discussions on the importance of explicit incorporation of dynamics in military 
spending models.  The extended SIPRI data-set (with large T) allows one to model not just the 
dynamics, but also the heterogeneity, cross-section dependence in panels and to test for structural 
breaks (Smith, 2017).  Perlo-Freeman (2017) discusses the process that led to the extension of the 
SIPRI time series and country data but acknowledges the limitations of measurement and the 
concerns of validity, reliability and comparability of the data.  More specifically for the MENA 
study, the extended treatment of threat proxies by including neighbouring countries’ military 
spending may lead to a reduced time period and countries.  If we want to keep the panel balanced 
then the cost is reduced T and N.   
Smith (1995) is an excellent reference for the understanding of the theory and empirics of military 
demand modeling.  We follow the neoclassical social welfare maximization model. All demand 
for military expenditures model ought to have a social welfare maximization model subject to 
budgetary constraints and a security variable distinguishing threats and strategic spillins (if there 
is some sort of alliance).  These models then add additional shift parametrization variables such as 
political parties, etc. 
For MENA we have the GDP variable that is part of the budget constraint, there is no price variable 
since we do not have a military price variable or it is assumed that there is no difference between 
civilian and military price (See Solomon, 2005, for further discussion). From the security function 
we have a number of threat variables.  The Markowski and Tani (2005) security cluster weighted 
by distance ought to provide a reasonable proxy for threats.  The Arab League and GCC are more 
an economic club than a military alliance.  As such, the relationship with military expenditures is 
purely positional (status). 
For variables that can shift the demand curve, the opportunity cost of military spending (see Douch 
and Solomon, 2014 and Douch and Solomon, 2016) is key.  The public choice arguments regarding 
rent seeking by the military bureaucracy and resource curse are additional parameters for 
consideration.   
 
 
 
2.1 Defining the MENA region 
The following countries are typically included in MENA: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen.3 
Table 1 presents the defence burden figures for 2016.  Note that 7 out of the top 10 countries 
belong to the MENA region.  The MENA countries considered doubled (113%) their military 
spending during the period 1990-2014 (Figure 1).  As shown in Figure 1, the trend in other regions 
such as the Sub-Saharan Africa (72%) and South America (54%) is rather muted.   
It is a stylized fact that the Middle East and North Africa region devote a disproportionate share 
of their revenues to military expenditure. It is not however clear if all countries in the region react 
to external or internal threats, or just means to provide rent to the military establishment 
(Springborg, 2011).  
Following Adams and Ciprut (1995) and Markowski and Tani (2005) who used the reaction-
response models in which a country’s decision to change military expenditure level at time, t, takes 
into account military spending of all allies and enemies at time, t-1, we develop ‘strategic clusters’ 
for all countries in the region. This concept of strategic cluster is used to identify group of nations 
whose combined defense expenditures are hypothesized to influence the military spending of the 
reference country.4 We also use the inverse of distance to reduce the influence of military spending 
by more geographically remote country in a given cluster. As noted in Markowski and Tani (2005), 
the selection of strategic clusters is prone to subjectivity in that it reflects the authors’ perception 
of security concerns in the region. 
Table 2 summarizes strategic clusters for all countries in the region. Panel 2.1 identify local 
clusters including countries perceived as friends or enemies amongst neighboring countries. Most 
GCC countries and Egypt perceive Israel and/or Iran as potential threats. Both countries are then 
in the strategic clusters for these countries. Saudi Arabia in the other hand is the ‘big brother’ and 
perceived as friend by these countries. Its military spending is then considered complementary to 
                                                          
3 Excluding Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Sudan, and Palestinian territories which are sometime included in the 
MENA region. 
4 In this exercise, we assume that alliance relationships and tension between countries remain intact over the sample 
period. Clusters are not dynamic and don’t change over time. 
their own spending, constituting a positive spillin in this case. In panel 2.2, regional power with 
impact on the MENA region military spending are identified. Israel, Iraq (for the period 1970-
1990), Russia (1990-2014), Turkey and Iran are again considered in this cluster. Finally, and in 
order to account for global power nations and their inevitable impact on the defense spending of 
MENA, panel 2.3 identify USA and USSR (1970-1990) as the global cluster.   
In dealing with this a priori strategic clusters, our main concern is to include all nations whose 
military expenditure is, in our view, likely to influence the spending of a particular country under 
consideration. The divide between local, regional and global clusters is again to show that, in 
theory, a country in the region will not react the same way to threats from a neighboring enemy or 
to a global power. Iraq versus Iran in the 1980s and Iraq against USA in the first and the second 
gulf wars are clear examples of how all this dynamics work.  
 
3. Econometric Approach 
In order to study the determinants of military expenditures in the context of MENA countries, we 
perform a regression analysis on the data using the following equation, 
40 1 2 3 7 85 67it it it t it jt t it it itME I OG G GDP WLCTH TH TH ARBL NATRRLβ β β β β β β β β ε= + + + ∆ + + + + + +      
Clearly, as discussed later, there are both economic and strategic factors which could be important 
in the determination of military spending in the region.  
From an econometric perspective and as it is well known in the literature, allowing for the presence 
of subject-specific unobserved heterogeneity represents one of the key advantages of using panel 
data. In this context, we deal with this unobserved heterogeneity by using the one-way fixed effects 
models, or by taking first differences if the second dimension of the panel is a proper time series, 
i.e. dynamic panel. Dynamic panels in which the regressors include the lagged dependent variable 
are developed around the work of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) for the two-step system extension. This approach is based on allowing 
for the modeling of a partial adjustment mechanism, and make use of the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) to construct efficient estimates of the dynamic panel data model. The basic idea 
behind the use GMM or any method of instrumental variables is to find a set of variables, termed 
instruments, that are correlated with the explanatory variables in the equation, but uncorrelated 
with the disturbances.  
Let us consider the matrix form of our model, assuming a dynamic form our model can be written 
as, 
1 ,   1,...,it it it itME ME X i Nλ β ε−∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =  
where Xit is the matrix of explanatory variables in the model.  
The GMM system estimation method being based on the first difference of the model, we estimate 
the K+1 parameters of the model, ( , ') ',θ λ β= by making use of the T(T-1)(K+1/2) moment 
conditions. The standard method of moments estimator consists of solving the unknown parameter 
vector θ by equating the theoretical moments with their empirical counterparts or estimates. By 
transforming the regressors by first differencing in the GMM system, the fixed country-specific 
effect is removed, because it does not vary with time. The Arellano and Bond GMM estimator of 
θ  is then given by, 
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where the moment conditions can be represented as ( )=0.i iE W ε∆  *ϒ  is the optimal weighting 
matrix given by the inverse of the long run variance covariance matrix and estimated by,  
1
* ' '
2
1
1ˆ .
N
i i i i
i
E W W
N
ε ε
−
=
  
ϒ = ∆ ∆  
  
∑  
System GMM is probably the most popular method of estimation used in the literature to solve 
dynamic panel models. In this work, we use the two-step system GMM and estimate the parameters 
of interest in our model. In our empirical analysis, the usual battery of tests is carried out to get the 
best specifications and validate our set of instruments.   
In order to compare our results with previous studies, we also use the fixed effects estimator. In 
this setup, the error term can be divided into two component, .it i itε µ ν= +  A fixed effect model 
assumes systematic differences among panel observations captured by dummies, where individual 
specific intercepts, iµ , are assumed to be fixed and known parameters included in the constant 
term. 
  Furthermore, in order to assess simultaneously both the short- and long-run we also consider the 
ARDL technique is this study. The ARDL approach estimates the effect of a particular variable on 
military expenditures separating the short-run from the long-run effects (Bentzen and Engsted, 
2001). ARDL is based on Pesaran (1997) and on Pesaran Shin and Smith (2001) where the 
dynamics is incorporated into the error correction model by using lags of the dependent and 
independent variables which allows for rich dynamics in the sense that the dependent variable 
adapts to changes in the explanatory variables. The ARDL (p, q1, …, qk) technique, where p is 
the lag of the dependent variable and qj is the lag of the independent variables (j = 1, 2, ..., k) can 
be stated, using the same terms as before, as follows, 
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Following the discussion in Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), and if the variables in (1) are, for 
example, I(1) and cointegrated, then the error term is an I(0) process for all i . This feature implies 
an error correction model in which the short-run dynamics of the variables in the system are 
influenced by the deviation from equilibrium. Thus it is common to reparametrize (1) into the 
following error correction equation: 
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which is the error-correcting speed of adjustment term and the vector iθ  which contains the long-
run relationships between the variables. The error-correcting term iφ  is expected to be significantly 
negative under the prior assumption that the variables show a return to a long-term equilibrium.   
 
3.1 Estimation Model 
As discussed earlier, we follow the traditional neoclassical empirical model where a state 
maximizes social welfare including security subject to budge constraints.  We utilize a panel 
regression method for 18 MENA countries for the period 1970 to 2014.  The estimated equation 
is: 
40 1 2 3 7 85 67it it it t it jt t it it itME I OG G GDP WLCTH TH TH ARBL NATRRLβ β β β β β β β β ε= + + + ∆ + + + + + +  
where: 
Iit = income proxied by GDP.     
OGit = non-defence expenditures computed as the total government expenditures minus defence 
spending. 
ΔG7GDPt = a measure of global economic activity represented by changes in G7 nations GDP. 
According to Markowski and Tani (2005) military expenditures may be used to stimulate 
economic conditions and one possible variable to proxy global economic condition is USA GDP.  
We use G7 as a more inclusive global measure.   
WLCTHit = Local threat and friendly spill in variable constructed using strategic clusters weighted 
by distance (we also have non weighted variable NWLCTHit) and constructed as follows, 
                itit
i
MilExWCLTH
D
=∑  and MilEx is military expenditures for countries in the country-
specific strategic cluster (see Table 2). This variable is used alternatively with the non-weighted 
local threat constructed the same way as WCLTH without controlling for distance, i.e., 
.it itNWCLTH MilEx=∑  
RLTHjt = Regional Threat or trigger for increase own military expenditure (see Table 2) 
THt = a measure of global instability represented by five different variables (used once at a time 
in our estimated equation).  
ARBLit = a measure of regional coalition, Arab League membership. While this regional grouping 
is not the same as traditional military alliances, it does provide a signal for status seeking within 
the MENA region.  It is the sum of all Arab league members Milex. Used alternatively with GCC. 
GCCit = another regional coalition measure (the 6 Arab golf nations). It is the sum of all military 
spending of the GCC members. 
NATRit = To control for the abundance of natural resources, particularly oil, in the region, NATR 
is constructed by summing the real rents (in 2015 $US) for the giving country from its natural 
resources. As an alternative, we estimate our model with disaggregated natural resources variables: 
Oilit, Mineralit, NatGasit,  Coalit and  Forestit.5 As shown in the literature (Ali and Abdellatif, 
2015), natural resources rents provide incentives to reward the protector of the states, that is, the 
military. 
 
4. Data and Estimation Results 
4.1 Data 
Level data are normalized using US and constant 2015 dollars.  SIPRI is the main source for 
military expenditures data while the World Bank economic indicators provide data on government 
spending (subtracting military spending), natural resources rent and GDP.  Note that the 
government spending variable (OG) is a proxy for the trade-off states face in their constrained 
optimization of social welfare.6   
Threat remains ill-defined in the demand for military spending models.  In order to shade light on 
this important variable we examine a number security structures for the MENA region.  In addition 
to the local, regional and global threat variables described in Table 2, we use additional global 
insecurity measures in the form of nuclear arsenal.  These global insecurity measures are discussed 
in Douch and Solomon (2014) and include total intercontinental ballistic missiles (NICM), total 
stock of nuclear arsenal (NTOT), nuclear explosion (NEX) and the doomsday clock. 
                                                          
5 Results for the disaggregate variables are available upon request. 
6 We used Polity variables to proxy institutions.  However, the overall results of the study remain unaffected.  The 
tables can be provided upon request 
 4.2      Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents the fixed effect panel estimate results.  Each column on the table denotes alternate 
proxies for global threats and security structures.  Regardless of specification, the income response 
of military expenditures exceeds one.  This is consistent with recent studies such as Markowski et 
al (2017) and indicates military spending as a positional (status) good.  Military spending is 
sensitive to trade-offs when competing with social spending.  This provides some evidence to the 
SIPRI (2017) report on relative increases in social spending observed in MENA regions.  However, 
one cannot rule out the possibility that some domestic security spending may be reflected in the 
other government spending figures. 
The regional clubs Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council tend to generate positive spillins 
or the motivation to “Keep up with the Neighbours”.  The response to these regional proxies is 
significant and positive in almost all the specification.  On average, a 10 percent increase in club 
spending results in a MENA state military spending of 7.6 percent.   
Another important factor affecting military spending in the MENA region is the so-called ‘resource 
curse’.  Ali and Abdellatif (2015) find that rents from oil and forest products lead to increase in 
military spending while other natural resources such as coal and gas tend to have negative effect.  
The aggregate natural resources rent variable in this study is negative and significant in all 
variations depicted in Table 3.  Although not shown here, disaggregated results by natural 
resources type remain inconclusive.   
The threat variables are significant in the majority of the cases as expected.  However, the weighted 
local security cluster tends to have a weaker effect (a 100% increase in the weighted local cluster 
results in only 5% increase in military spending).  We observe stronger response to global threat 
proxies such as nuclear intercontinental missiles, the doomsday clock and international clusters 
(US and USSR 1970-1990).   Another important finding regarding the threat proxies relate to 
regional threats.  Recall that regional threats include military spending of Iran, Israel, Turkey as 
well as Russia (for the period 2000-2014) and Iraq (1980-1990).  In all model specifications, the 
fixed effect panel estimate (Table 3) exhibits a negative and significant response to regional 
threats. 
With the availability of the extended military spending dataset from SIPRI one can tease out 
strategic interactions fully to understand spillins and spatial issues.  In addition, we can explicitly 
incorporate dynamic aspects of and military spending and these are detailed in Table 4. 
Specifically we employ the ARDL approach to cointegration to estimate both the long and short 
run effects.  Table 4A presents the long run effects and military spending continues to exhibit 
strong income elasticity.  MENA states face tradeoffs between social and security demands and 
react strongly and positively to Arab league nations’ spending.   
Natural resources do not impact military spending in the long run while local threats are only 
weakly significant.  Negative response to the regional threat persists in the long run but the proxy 
is significant in only three specifications.  The long run estimates also show similarly weak 
response to global threats.  Table 4B presents the short run dynamics.  In general military 
expenditures in MENA countries respond to income and Arab League’s spending in the short run.  
None of the security cluster proxies are significant in the short run and the aggregate natural 
resources proxy also remains insignificant.  In the short run status seems to trump threat.   
In the empirical literature, the development and application of Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) has become particularly popular. Introduced by Arellano-Bond (1991), Arellano-Bover 
(1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998), the difference and the system GMM estimators are designed to 
extract causal relationships from data on a large number of individuals over time. These 
instrumental variable methods are usually used to tackle omitted variables, endogeneity and 
measurement error problems and avoids using weak instruments in the System GMM setup. This 
paper considers the dynamic panel data using a two-step system GMM (Blundell-Bond, 1998) 
over other panel data techniques. Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2001) and Roodman (2009) 
provide excellent summaries of the GMM methodology. 
Table 5 presents the GMM estimate to further the robustness diagnostics.  Note that we are unable 
to reject the null that all instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.  The high income elasticity 
is once again evident.  Similarly the trade-off among security and social spending remain strong 
using the system GMM estimates.  Response to various levels of security clusters are not 
significant.  For the first time the additional status proxy, Arab League or Gulf Cooperation 
Council is not significant. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The various estimation methods and model specifications reveal the following insights.  First 
regardless of models or econometric methods, the high income elasticity of military expenditures 
is consistent.  Second, MENA countries face large tradeoff elasticities between security and social 
spending.   Third, in majority of the models and estimation techniques status is signaled through 
regional clubs such as the Arab League.  Fourth, status and not necessarily local and regional 
threats drive military spending in MENA countries.  Finally, the so-called ‘resource curse’ is not 
a strong indicator of military posture in MENA especially within the neoclassical demand model 
setting and robust estimation that account for dynamics and endogeneity.   
While the results indicate a potential inclination towards status as opposed to security in the 
determination of military expenditures, the result remain tentative until a comprehensive military 
capabilities based measure is developed.  However, the use of comprehensive threat proxies show 
merit in future models of military demand models. 
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Table 1 Top Countries by Defence Burden (Military Expenditures to GDP) 
Rank Country Defence 
Burden 
2016 
1 Oman 16.7% 
2 Saudi Arabia 10.4% 
3 Congo 7.0% 
4 Algeria 6.7% 
5 Kuwait 6.5% 
6 Israel 5.8% 
7 Russian Federation 5.3% 
8 Iraq 4.8% 
9 Bahrain 4.8% 
10 Jordan 4.5% 
Source:  SIPRI (2017) 
 
Table 2: Strategic clusters by country in the MENA region 
2.1 - Local Cluster      
Country Strategic Cluster 
Algeria 
Morocco 
(942) Israel (3223) 
 Bahrain Iran (768) Israel (1631) 
Saudi Arabia 
(604) Iraq [1970 -1990] (1035) 
 Egypt Iran (2297) Israel (612) 
Saudi Arabia 
(1472) Iraq [1970 -1990] (1429) 
 Iran 
Saudi Arabia 
(1268) Israel (1789) 
Iraq (1970 -
1990) (941) 
Turkey 
(1816) Syria (1387) 
 Iraq Iran (941) Israel (867) Turkey (991) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(1044) 
Syria (467) 
 Jordan Iran (1668) Israel (142) Syria (534) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
(1147) Iraq [1970 -1990] (762) 
 Kuwait Iran (687) Israel (1231) 
Iraq [1970 -
1990] (565) Saudi Arabia (647) 
 Lebanon Syria (307) Israel (326) Saudi Arabia (1423) 
 Libya 
Algeria 
(1553) Egypt (1353) 
Tunisia 
(1117) Morocco (2439) 
 Morocco Algeria  (942) 
Saudi Arabia 
(5165) Israel (3964) 
 Oman 
Saudi Arabia 
(1144) Yemen (1023) United Arab Emirates  (301) 
 Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
(639) 
United Arab 
Emirates  (345) Israel (1721) 
 Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
(896) Iran (1268) Israel (1284) 
Iraq 
(1970 -
1990) 
Kuwait 
(647) Qatar (639) 
 Syria 
Lebanon 
(307) 
Saudi Arabia 
(1346) Israel (569) 
Turkey 
(570) 
Iraq 
[1970 -
1990] 
(467) Iran (1387) 
Tunisia Algeria (993) Libya (1117) 
United Arab 
Emirates   Iran (998) 
Saudi Arabia 
(896) Israel (2058) 
Qatar 
(345) Iraq [1970 -1990] (1473 ) 
Yemen Saudi Arabia (990) 
Israel 
Saudi Arabia 
(1284) Egypt (612) Syria (569) 
Iran 
(1789) Iraq [1970 -1990] (867) 
       
       
2.2 - Regional Cluster 
 
Iran 
 
Israel 
 
Russia (2000 - 2014) 
 
Turkey 
 
Iraq (1980 - 
1990) 
       
2.3 - International Cluster 
 
    
    
 
    
United States 
 
 
Soviet Union: 1970 – 1990 
  
 
 
Note: numbers in parenthesis include distance in KM (gravity center of the country as per Google Map: Link- 
https://www.distancefromto.net/ [Accessed October 2017]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Fixed Effect Model – Sample Period: 1970 - 2015 
 
Variable Model  1 Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
 
GDP(-1) 1.0641*** 1.0717*** 1.0682*** 1.0787*** 1.0706*** 1.0905*** 1.0796*** 
OG(-1) -0.5113*** -0.5977*** -0.5106*** -0.5833*** -0.5249*** -0.5479*** -0.5117*** 
ΔG7GDP(-1) -0.0059 -0.0124 -0.0060 -0.00009  -0.0032   -0.0080   -0.0054   
ARBL(-1) 0.7843*** ---- 0.7904*** 0.8674*** 0.6987*** -0.1081*** 0.5451*** 
GCC(-1) ---- 0.5971*** ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
NATR(-1) -0.2203*** -0.1439*** -0.2226*** -0.1566*** -0.1916*** -0.0298 -0.2069*** 
        
WLCTH(-1) 0.0484* 0.0665** ---- 0.0517* 0.0499*    0.2223*** 0.0474*** 
NWLCTH(-1) ---- ----   0.0335 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
RLTH(-1) -0.0876*** -0.0420 -0.0785*** -0.1120*** -0.0395 -0.1081*** -0.0551** 
GLTH(-1) 0.2844*** 0.0694 0.2833*** ---- ---- ---- ---- 
NICM(-1) ---- ---- ---- 0.6278*** ---- ---- ---- 
NEX(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.0234 ---- ---- 
NTOT(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- --- -0.2077*** ---- 
Doomsday(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 2.8840*** 
F-Test P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% and * 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-A: Dynamic Panel-Data - ARDL Model - Long Run Coefficients – Sample: 1970 -2015 
 
Variable Model  1 Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
 
GDP(-1) 0.6604*** 0.6402** 0.7240*** 0.5722*** 1.4911*** 0.5655***  0.5521*** 
OG(-1) -0.1384*** -0.1529 -0.1287 -0.2270*** -0.9002*** -0.2003**  -0.1666* 
ΔG7GDP(-1) -0.0095 -0.0598*** -0.0192*** -0.0152** -0.0154*** -0.0221***  -0.0191** 
ARBL(-1)  0.7372*** ---- 0.6691*** 0.7199*** -0.2230** 0.6250***  0.6483*** 
GCC(-1) ---- 0.2253 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
NATR(-1)  -0.0686 0.0815  -0.0925 -0.0110  0.1090* -0.0197  -0.0043 
WLCTH(-1)  0.0151  0.0364 ----  0.0424**  0.1340***     0.0060 0.0417* 
NWLCTH(-1) ---- ---- 0.0144 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
RLTH(-1)  -0.0493***  -0.0880**  -0.0374*  -0.0271 -0.0214   -0.0067  -0.0188 
GLTH(-1)  0.18456*** -0.0518     0.1520** ---- ---- ---- ---- 
NICM(-1) ---- ---- ----  0.0993 ---- ---- ---- 
NEX(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.1319***  ---- ---- 
NTOT(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---  -0.0240 ---- 
Doomsday(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  -0.0653 
 
*** denotes 1% significance level, ** 5% and * 10%. 
Table 3-B: Dynamic Panel-Data - ARDL Model - Short Run Representation – Sample: 1970-2015 
Variable Model  1 Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
 
CoinEq -0.1711***  -0.1000***  -0.1608*** -0.1722*** -0.11794***  -0.1734***  -0.1601*** 
ΔGDP 0.3968**   0.3772**  0.4080**  0.4345**    0.5523***  0.4006**  0.4216** 
ΔOG -0.1884  -0.1710  -0.1890  -0.1990   -0.2277  -0.1947 -0.1932 
Δ(ΔG7GDP) -0.0065 -0.0091* -0.0068 -0.0064   -0.00568  -0.0069 -0.0059 
ΔARBL 0.3012*** ---- 0.2820*** 0.3061***   0.1919** 0.2759*** ---- 
ΔGCC ----  0.3262* ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
ΔNATR -0.0092  0.0397  -0.0060  -0.0021    0.0171  0.0063 0.0124 
ΔWLCTH -0.0870 -0.2417 ---- -0.0902    -0.0312 -0.1549* -0.0835 
ΔNWLCTH ---- ---- 0.0414 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
ΔRLTH -0.5759 -0.5343 -0.6531 -0.5685    -0.5362 -0.5322 -0.5774 
ΔGLTH 0.0759** 0.0435 0.0460 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
ΔNICM ---- ---- ---- 0.06597 ---- ---- ---- 
ΔNEX ---- ---- ---- ----     0.0203 ---- ---- 
ΔNTOT ---- ---- ---- ---- ----   0.4909 ---- 
ΔDoomsday ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 1.2815** 
β0  -2.040***  0.9346***  -1.7710***  -0.994***    0.1919** -0.4345*** -0.6399*** 
 
*** denotes 1% significance level, ** 5% and * 10%. See Table 2 notes for model and variable descriptions. 
β0 is the intercept term and the cointegration equation coefficient is denoted by CoinEq. 
Table 4: Dynamic Panel-Data Estimation - Two-Step System GMM – Sample: 1970 - 2015 
Variable Model  1 Model 2 Model  3 Model  4 Model  5 Model  6 Model  7 
GDP(-1) 1.1890*** 1.1549*** 1.0840*** 1.5634* 1.0299* 0.8820* 0.8830** 
OG(-1) -0.7138** -0.7300*** -0.6107* -1.4135* -0.7422** -0.6644** -0.7296*** 
ΔG7GDP(-1) -0.0074 -0.0061 -0.0059 0.0125 -0.0068 -0.0018 0.0100 
ARBL(-1)  0.0321 0.0265 ---- -0.0165 -0.0092 -0.0034 -0.0123 
GCC(-1) ---- ---- 0.0281 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
NATR(-1) -0.0087 -0.0032 -0.0300 0.1538 0.0515 0.0922 0.1152 
        
WLCTH(-1) 0.1739* ---- 0.1682 0.2195* 0.1550 0.2091** 0.1885** 
NWLCTH(-1) ---- 0.1536 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
RLTH(-1) -0.1217 -0.1046 -0.0895 -0.1937** -0.1088 -0.1451 -0.1536** 
GLTH(-1) -0.0288 -0.0537 -0.1021 ---- ---- ---- ---- 
NICM(-1) ---- ---- ---- 0.6527 ---- ---- ---- 
NEX(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0141 ---- ---- 
NTOT(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0849 ---- 
Doomsday(-1) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 3.4240* 
Hansen test of 
overidentification 
0.7680 0.8280 0.7030 0.8720 0.7380 0.7070 0.9110 
Number of Obs 752 752 752 720 752 752 752 
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% and * 10% 
- Sargan–Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions regresses the residuals from the GMM 
regression on all instruments. The null hypothesis for this test is that all instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Trends in Military Expenditures:  Selected Regions  
 
Source SIPRI (2017) 
